Mercer Law Review
Volume 73
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 19

12-2021

Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration
Mary F. Radford

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Radford, Mary F. (2021) "Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 19.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol73/iss1/19

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
Mary F. Radford*
This Article discusses significant cases decided by the Georgia Court
of Appeals during the period of June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021,
pertaining to Georgia fiduciary law, guardianship, and estate planning.1
This Article also describes the highlights of legislation contained in a
comprehensive bill that revised and clarified the laws relating to wills,
trusts, and the administration of estates and that became effective
January 1, 2021.2
I. GEORGIA CASES
A. Latent Ambiguities in Wills
In Luke v. Luke,3 the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the Ben Hill
Superior Court’s finding that certain provisions in a will were
unambiguous and remanded the case for an examination of parol
evidence in order to discern the testator’s intent. 4 The will devised the
testator’s share in the “‘Andrew W. Luke Irrevocable Trust’” to her son

*Professor

Emerita, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of Tulane
University (B.A., 1974); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Reporter, Probate
Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee, Trust Code Revision
Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Past President, American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC). Author, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIPS AND
CONSERVATORSHIPS (West, 2021–22 ed.); REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
GEORGIA (West, 2021–22 ed.); GEORGIA TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (West, 2021–22 ed.). The
author is grateful to Georgia State University College of Law graduate Justin Sheffield,
Class of 2021, for his valuable research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Wills, Trusts, Guardianship, and Fiduciary Administration law
during the prior Survey period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianship, and
Fiduciary Administration, Georgia Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 327 (2020).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess. (2020).
3. 356 Ga. App. 271, 846 S.E.2d 216 (2020).
4. Id. at 273, 846 S.E.2d at 219.
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even though no such trust existed. 5 There was, in fact, an “‘Andrew W.
Luke Revocable Trust’” 6 in existence, but the testator was not a
beneficiary of that trust. The court of appeals pointed out these were
latent ambiguities because they became apparent only when the words
of the will were put into operation.7 As to the first problem—the
misnamed trust—the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that
this may have only been a scrivener’s error in referencing the nonexistent Irrevocable Trust, as opposed to the Revocable Trust. 8 However,
the court of appeals found the second problem to be more serious, holding
that portion of the will “cannot be put into operation without resolving
that ambiguity.”9 The court of appeals went on to note that, to resolve an
ambiguity in a will, “parol evidence of all of the facts and circumstances
respecting persons and property to which the will relates are admissible
as legitimate evidence to show the intention and application of the words
used.”10 Thus, the trial court must hear parol evidence before ruling on
the testator’s intent because Item Four contained a latent ambiguity.
Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and
remanded the case with direction.11
B. Presumption that the Will Was Validly Executed and Attested
Georgia law requires a testator either sign the will in the presence of
two witnesses or acknowledge his or her signature to the witnesses. 12 In
the case of In re Estate of McLendon,13 the witnesses, who had signed the
will ten years prior to the testator’s death, could not remember the exact
circumstances surrounding their signing of the will.14 When a petition
was filed to admit the will to probate, the witnesses’ testimony at the
hearing in the Bartow Probate Court was “contradictory.” One witness
testified he did not remember whether the testator had already signed
the will when the witness signed it. However, this same witness also
5. Id. at 273, 846 S.E.2d at 218.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 272–73, 846 S.E.2d at 218. The difference between latent and patent
ambiguities is discussed in Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN
GEORGIA § 7:10 (2019–2020 ed.), which was quoted by the court of appeals.
8. Luke, 356 Ga. App. at 273, 846 S.E.2d at 218.
9. Id. at 273, 846 S.E.2d at 218–19.
10. Id. at 273, 846 S.E.2d at 219 (quoting Legare v. Legare, 268 Ga. 474, 476, 490
S.E.2d 369, 371–72 (1997)).
11. Id.
12. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20 (2021); Waldrep v. Goodwin, 230 Ga. 1, 3–4, 195 S.E.2d 432, 434
(1973).
13. 359 Ga. App. 259, 857 S.E.2d 268 (2021).
14. Id. at 260, 857 S.E.2d at 269.
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testified the testator had not signed the will when he (the witness) signed
it. The second witness testified he only remembered signing the will and
did not remember whether there were any signatures on it when he
signed it. But he also testified he had not seen any signatures. The
probate court admitted the will to probate even though the caveators had
argued the testator had neither signed the will in the presence of the
witnesses nor acknowledged his signature to them.15
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s application
of the presumption of validity. 16 The probate court and the court of
appeals cited Glenn v. Mann17 for the proposition that “[w]here a witness
fails to remember events surrounding the will’s execution, there is a
presumption, given proof of the signatures appearing on the will, that all
was done as the law requires.”18 The court of appeals held despite the
contradictory testimony, there was “some evidence [to] support[] the
probate court’s finding that the witnesses did not remember the
formalities of execution and attestation[,]” and thus the court of appeals
would uphold the probate court’s conclusion that the testimony did not
overcome the presumption of validity.19
C. In Terrorem Clauses in Trusts
During the reporting period, the Georgia Court of Appeals handed
down two cases that examined the effect of in terrorem clauses. Both
cases involved disputes among siblings. In terrorem clauses are clauses
in wills and trusts designed to discourage vexatious litigation by
providing a person who unsuccessfully challenges the validity of the will
or trust will forfeit any interest that person would otherwise take under
the will or trust.20
Legislation that became effective on January 1, 2021, clarified in
terrorem clauses are not enforceable if the challenger’s claim is one for
“interpretation or enforcement of the will; . . . an accounting, for removal,
or for other relief against a personal representative;” or who is “entering

15. Id.
16. Id. at 261, 857 S.E.2d at 269–70.
17. 234 Ga. 194, 214 S.E.2d 911 (1975).
18. McLendon, 359 Ga. App. at 260, 857 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting Mann, 234 Ga. at 198,
214 S.E.2d at 915–16).
19. Id. at 261, 857 S.E.2d at 269–70.
20. See Mary F. Radford, GEORGIA TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2:1(A) (2020–2021 ed.) for
a definition and discussion of in terrorem clauses in trusts.
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into a settlement agreement.”21 In Barry v. Barry,22 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the Union Superior Court’s finding that a purported
petition to “seek an accounting” was in reality litigation that was
designed to contest the authority of the personal representative/trustee
and thus was a violation of the in terrorem clauses contained in the
challenger’s father’s will and a trust set up by her parents.23
Consequently, the testator’s daughter, Cynthia Barry (Cynthia), forfeited
her beneficial interests in both the will and the trust. Cynthia’s brother,
Thomas Barry (Thomas), was named as personal representative in the
will and as trustee of the trust. Basically, the will and trust equally
distributed the parents’ assets among Cynthia, Thomas, and another
sibling. The trial court enumerated a series of actions by Cynthia that
the court found were indicative of her desire to “gain control of her
father’s estate.”24
Although Thomas lived in Maine, and was caring for an ailing wife, he
managed within ninety days to produce a preliminary accounting and
valuation of the assets and liabilities of the estate. 25 However, when he
sought to hire a lawyer in the father’s small hometown to help with the
probate of the estate, the two local attorneys he contacted informed him
that they could not take the case. Cynthia had contacted both lawyers
and even though she did not hire either, she gave them enough
confidential information to create a conflict of interest, which she refused
to waive. The will and trust gave Thomas unfettered discretion to value,
sell, and distribute estate assets in cash or in kind. 26 Thomas made
several attempts to seek Cynthia’s input in dealing with the estate, even
after she sued him. Cynthia refused to open an account to hold her share
of estate stock; she did not cooperate in setting a time to divide the
father’s personal property; she hired her own appraiser to appraise the
father’s residence and insisted that the professional appraisal Thomas
21. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-15 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68). The 2021 Amendments
added the same provision to the statute relating to in terrorem clauses that appear in trusts.
Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-74 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22).
22. 357 Ga. App. 479, 851 S.E.2d 119 (2020).
23. Id. at 479–81, 851 S.E.2d at 120–21.
24. Id. at 480, 851 S.E.2d at 121. After Cynthia’s mother died in 2011, Cynthia
contacted the law firm her father had retained to assist with the Trust and asked them
about having her father declared incompetent. (Her father lived for another four years, and
there was never any evidence that he was incompetent.) Cynthia, a Florida lawyer,
demanded confidential information from the firm and, when they refused, threatened
litigation by demanding to see their malpractice insurance policy. When the father died in
November 2015, Cynthia immediately began threatening litigation against Thomas, her
sister, and her niece. Id.
25. Id. at 482, 851 S.E.2d at 121–22.
26. Id. at 481, 851 S.E.2d at 121.
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had gotten was inadequate. For a year, she refused to respond to
Thomas’s request for input as to whether she wanted an in-kind or cash
value distribution of stock and then complained that he had breached his
fiduciary duty in selling the stock.27
The trial court concluded that Cynthia’s actions were brought “with
malice, without substantial justification, [and] in bad faith[.]” 28 More
importantly, the trial court concluded—and the court of appeals agreed—
that Cynthia had, in effect, contested the will provisions, instituted a
proceeding to prevent the will from being carried out according to its
terms,29 and “at least indirectly” contested the trust provisions that
named Thomas as trustee and gave him the broad authority to value,
manage, and divide the trust assets. 30 These actions constituted
violations of the in terrorem clauses in the will and the trust. Cynthia’s
contention that she had merely been petitioning for an accounting was
dismissed, with the court of appeals stating “neither the trial court nor
this Court is confined by the nomenclature used in any particular cause
of action, nor will we turn a blind eye to one’s actual intent.” 31
The case of Giller v. Slosberg32 arose in the context of a contentious
relationship between a brother and his two sisters. 33 A jury entered a
verdict in favor of the brother on the charge that the sisters had unduly
influenced their father in making beneficiary designations in an
individual retirement account (IRA), an agency account, and a trust. 34
The trust contained an in terrorem clause that provided the interest of
any person who challenged the validity of the trust would be “revoked
and annulled.”35 In their appeal, the sisters did not challenge the jury’s
findings that they had exerted undue influence but instead claimed,
among other things, the in terrorem clause in the trust precluded the
brother from receiving any of the trust assets. 36 In a split decision,37 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held the brother’s actions in initiating the
lawsuit violated the in terrorem clause in the trust and thus he was not
27. Id. at 438–84, 851 S.E.2d at 122–23.
28. Id. at 484, 851 S.E.2d at 123.
29. Id. at 485, 851 S.E.2d at 123.
30. Id. at 487, 851 S.E.2d at 125.
31. Id. at 486, 851 S.E.2d at 124.
32. 359 Ga. App. 867, 858 S.E.2d 747 (2021).
33. Id. at 867, 858 S.E.2d at 749.
34. Id. at 867–68, 858 S.E.2d at 749–50.
35. Id. at 870–71, 858 S.E.2d at 751.
36. Id. at 869, 858 S.E.2d at 750.
37. The majority opinion was written by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps and joined by
Judge Rickman. Chief Judge McFadden wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 867, 858 S.E.2d
at 749.
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entitled to any of the trust assets. 38 The majority opinion claimed it was
strictly construing section 53, chapter 12, section 22(b) of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), which does not include language
stating, if a trust is invalid, the in terrorem clause is inoperable.39 Chief
Judge McFadden, writing in dissent, stated when the trust itself was
declared invalid, “[t]he in terrorem clause falls along with the rest of the
instrument.”40 He pointed out the majority was trying to “animate
stillborn instruments.”41 He clearly disapproved of the majority’s
conclusion, stating:
There appear to be no previous cases in which our appellate courts
have faced the audacious claim the appellants make here: even though
they have been found to have procured the trust before us by means of
undue influence and do not contest that finding, they nevertheless
claim to be fully entitled to all of their ill-gotten gains.42

The decision in this case is clearly wrong for the reasons set forth in
Chief Judge McFadden’s dissenting opinion. The court of appeals also
held that the superior court had no authority to impose a constructive
trust on the amounts in the IRA and agency accounts. 43 It reasoned
because neither the jury nor the superior court had made a finding of
“unjust enrichment,” the superior court’s only authority was to declare
these accounts invalid, thus causing the monies in the accounts to become
part of the father’s estate.44 Again, it is difficult to fathom why the
majority did not conclude when property is gained through the exercise
of undue influence, it clearly results in unjust enrichment.
D. Interaction between Guardianship Statute and Estate Administration
Statute
The case of In re Estate of Brown45 explored the interaction between a
statute in Title 53 of the O.C.G.A.,46 which covers generally wills and the
administration of decedents’ estates, with a statute in title 29,47 which
covers guardianships and conservatorships. In 2011, the Fulton County
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 870, 858 S.E.2d at 750–51.
Id. at 870, 858 S.E.2d at 751.
Id. at 877, 858 S.E.2d at 755 (McFadden, C.J., dissenting).
Id at 878, 858 S.E.2d at 756 (McFadden, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 880, 858 S.E.2d at 757 (McFadden, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 876–77, 858 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 877, 858 S.E.2d at 755.
357 Ga. App. 869, 850 S.E.2d 503 (2020).
O.C.G.A. tit. 53 (2021).
O.C.G.A. tit. 29 (2021).
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administrator and conservator (Fulton County administrator)48 was
appointed conservator49 of Leon Brown by the Fulton County Probate
Court.50 When Brown died intestate in 2019, the Fulton County probate
court appointed the same county administrator as ex-officio
administrator of Brown’s estate, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 29-5-72(g).51
This Code section provides in pertinent part as follows: “When a ward for
whom the county administrator or county guardian has been previously
appointed as conservator dies intestate, the conservator shall proceed to
distribute the ward’s estate in the same manner as if the conservator had
been appointed administrator of the estate.”52
Brown’s daughter and other heirs objected to the appointment because
Brown had been domiciled in Henry County when he died and thus the
Henry County Probate Court had jurisdiction over the appointment of
the administrator of his estate.53 The daughter relied on O.C.G.A.
§ 53-6-21(a),54 which requires a petition for letters of administration to
be filed in the county in which the decedent was domiciled at death. A
petition to administer Brown’s estate had been filed in Henry County,
but the probate court of Henry County dismissed the petition because the
Fulton County administrator had been serving as Brown’s conservator
when he died.55
The Georgia Court of Appeals based its analysis on the maxim that a
“‘specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication
of a contrary legislative intent.’”56 The court opined the statute relied

48. O.C.G.A. § 53-6-35 requires the probate judge of each county in Georgia to “appoint
a county administrator whose duty shall be to take charge of all estates unrepresented and
not likely to be represented.” O.C.G.A. § 29-8-1 provides that the county administrators are
“ex officio county guardians and shall serve as guardians or conservators in all cases where
appointed by the court.” “County guardians typically serve as conservators rather than
guardians. However, the term ‘county guardian’ was maintained in the Revised [Georgia
Guardianship] Code due to its long-standing use in Georgia.” See Mary F. Radford, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP § 8:1 (2020–21 ed.). The court of appeals in the
Brown case used the term “county administrator and conservator.”
49. A conservator is a person who is appointed by the probate court to manage the
property of a minor or an adult who has been found to be incapable of managing his or her
property. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-1(a) (2021). Conservatorships of adults are discussed in Mary F.
Radford, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS Ch. 5 (2020–2021 ed.).
50. Brown, 357 Ga. App. at 869, 850 S.E.2d at 503–04.
51. Id. at 869, 850 S.E.2d at 504.
52. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-72(g) (2021)
53. Brown, 357 Ga. App. at 870, 850 S.E.2d at 504.
54. O.C.G.A. § 53-6-21(a) (2021).
55. Brown, 357 Ga. App. at 870, 850 S.E.2d at 504.
56. Id. at 850 S.E.2d at 504 (quoting Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 632, 634, 791 S.E.2d
55, 56–57 (2016)).
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upon by the Fulton County administrator was a “specific statute” (in that
it “applie[d] only when the county administrator or county guardian ha[d]
been appointed conservator and the ward dies intestate”) while the
statute upon which the daughter relied was a “general statute” (in that
it applied to “[e]very petition for letters of administration[]”).57 The court
of appeals ruled the specific statute prevailed. Additionally, it noted the
specific statute had been enacted later in time (2006) than the general
statute (1997) and that the legislature was presumed to know “the
condition of the law and to enact statutes with reference to it, . . . the
provisions of the statute enacted latest in time carry greater weight.” 58
II. GEORGIA LEGISLATION
A. Overview of the Legislation
In June 2020, the Georgia General Assembly enacted sweeping
legislation pertaining to wills, trusts, and the administration of estates. 59
The bill was signed into law by the Governor on July 29, 2020, and the
new provisions became effective on January 1, 2021. 60 Highlights of the
new legislation are described below. The new legislation will be referred
to hereinafter as the 2021 Amendments. As will be noted, while several
of the provisions of the 2021 Amendments contain substantive changes
or new additions to the Georgia Code, others are simply clarifications or
codifications of existing law.
B. Amendments Relating to Probate Court Jurisdiction
Under Article VI, Section III, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution,
probate courts in Georgia “shall have such jurisdiction as now or
hereafter provided by law[.]”61 While most probate courts in Georgia have
limited jurisdiction, O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2)62 provides probate courts in
the counties that have a population of at least 90,000 and in which the
probate judge has been admitted to the practice of law for at least seven

57. Brown, 357 Ga. App. at 870–71, 850 S.E.2d at 504.
58. Id. at 871, 850 S.E.2d at 504 (quoting Williams, 299 Ga. at 634, 791 S.E.2d at 56).
59. Ga. H.R. Bill 865.
60. Id. at § 3-1.
61. GA. CONST. art. VI, § III, para. I. The subject matter jurisdiction of Georgia probate
courts is discussed in Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN
GEORGIA § 6:3 (2020–2021 ed.).
62. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120 (2021); O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2) defines these counties as those
that have a population of 90,000 or more and in which the probate judge has been admitted
to the practice of law for at least seven years. Parties to civil cases in these probate courts
may demand a jury trial. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-121 (2021).
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years, have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior courts over a
variety of matters over which the other probate courts have no
authority.63 The 2021 Amendments expanded this list to include the
adjudication of matters related to trusts, trustees, and trust directors 64
as well as the construction of trust instruments. 65 Because trusts are
traditionally “subjects of equity jurisdiction[,]” 66 the 2021 Amendments
added subsection (b) to O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127, which allows these probate
courts with expanded jurisdiction, among other things, to “[a]pply
equitable principles.”67
The 2021 Amendments also added the adjudication of matters relating
to power of attorney68 to the list of matters over which the probate courts
with expanded jurisdiction have authority.69 A power of attorney is a
legal mechanism which allows an individual (the principal)70 to appoint
another person (the agent)71 to act for the principal in matters relating
to the principal’s property. Actions by the agent bind the principal in the
same manner as if the principal had acted. 72 O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-16 allows
a variety of persons to “petition a court to construe a power of attorney
or to review” the conduct of the agent who has been appointed by the
principal.73 O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(a) lists certain powers that an agent
may exercise only if given express authority by the principal to do so.74
O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(i) allows an agent who has not been given this
authority to petition a court to exercise such a power. 75 The 2021

63. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127(a) (2021).
64. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 2-22(a)(4) (amending O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127(a)(4) (2021)).
65. Id. at § 2-22(a)(7) (amending O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127(a)(7)).
66. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6(a) (2021).
67. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 2-22(b)(1) (amending O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127).
68. The Georgia Power of Attorney Act is contained in title 10, chapter 6B of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated.
69. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 2-22(a)(5)–(6) (adding O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127(a)(5)–(6)).
70. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-2(9) (2021).
71. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-2(1) (2021).
72. Power of attorney is discussed in Mary F. Radford, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP AND
CONSERVATORSHIP § 1-23 (2021–22 ed.).
73. Those who may petition the court are: “[t]he principal or agent;” a “person asked to
accept the power of attorney;” “[a] guardian, conservator, personal representative or other
fiduciary acting for the principal or the principal’s estate;” “[t]he principal’s spouse, parent
or descendant;” a principal’s qualifying presumptive heir; a named beneficiary of the
principal’s trust or estate; a government agency that has the authority to protect the
principal’s welfare; or the principal’s caregiver or another who has sufficient interest in the
principal’s welfare. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-16(a) (2021).
74. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(a) (2021).
75. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(i).
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Amendments give those probate courts that have expanded jurisdiction
the authority to hear these types of petitions.
The 2021 Amendments also enlarged the jurisdiction of those probate
courts that do not have expanded jurisdiction to include two additional
types of cases. First, the 2021 Amendments allow all probate courts to
order DNA testing on the remains of a decedent and any party in interest
for the purpose of determining the statistical likelihood of kinship. 76 This
authority, which is concurrent with the superior courts, includes the
authority to order the disinterment of the remains of the decedent. Such
an action may be necessary in order to determine who are the legal heirs
of the decedent.77 Second, the 2021 Amendments allow all probate courts
to approve settlement agreements that provide probate will be granted
or denied or a decedent’s property will be distributed in a manner that is
contrary to the terms of the will.78 Jurisdiction over a settlement
agreement may be exercised by the probate court or by a superior court
upon appeal or transfer from the probate court. 79
C. Amendments Relating to Wills and Probate
1. Separate Documents Made Part of the Will
Typically, the terms of a will are contained in one document that is
signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses. The common law
doctrine of “incorporation by reference” allows a testator to make the
terms of another existing document a part of the will by referencing that
document in the will.80 The 2021 Amendments added O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4,
which codifies the common law doctrine of incorporation by reference. 81
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(a) allows an extrinsic document to be incorporated by
reference into a will provided the writing is in existence when the will is
executed, the will manifests an intent to incorporate the document, and
the document is described sufficiently to permit its identification.82

76. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-3(a) (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-2-27).
77. The procedure for determining the identity of or interest of an heir is discussed in
Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 9:6 (2021–22 ed.).
78. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-24(b) (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25).
79. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(a)(1) (2021).
80. For example, O.C.G.A. § 53-12-263(a) allows a testator to incorporate by reference
into the will any or all of the fiduciary powers that are listed in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-261.
81. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-13. Subsection b provides: “This Code section shall not be
construed to imply that the common law does not permit the incorporation of an extrinsic
document into a will by reference in the manner authorized under subsection (a) of this
Code section.” O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(b).
82. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(a) (2021).

2021

WILLS & TRUSTS

291

The 2021 Amendments also added new O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5, which
permits a testator to use a separate writing or list to dispose of certain
items of property rather than include the list in the will itself. 83 Whereas
a document that is incorporated by reference must be in existence at the
time the will is executed, a writing under this latter statute may be
prepared after the will has been executed and need only be in existence
when the testator dies.84 The new code section applies only to the
disposition of tangible personal property (other than money) that is not
otherwise specifically addressed in the will itself. 85 The writing must be
one that: “(1) [i]s signed and dated by the testator; (2) [d]escribes the
items and the beneficiaries with reasonable certainty; and (3) [i]s
referred to in the testator’s will.”86 The writing may be amended after it
is prepared provided it is again signed and dated by the testator. 87 A
writing such as this would allow a testator to dispose of items of personal
property that are acquired after the will execution without having to
make a formal amendment to the will with each new acquisition.
2. Who May Offer a Will for Probate?
O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2(b) provides that an executor, if one is named in the
will, has the first right to offer the will for probate.88 However, if no
executor is named or the named executor fails to offer the will for probate,
any “interested person” may offer the will for probate. 89 The 2021
Amendments added an expansive definition of the term “interested
person” to include:
[A]ny heir of the decedent; legatee, devisee, or beneficiary under the
will; creditor of the decedent; purchaser from an heir of the decedent;
administrator or temporary administrator appointed for the estate of
the decedent prior to the discovery of the will; trustee or beneficiary of
a testamentary trust established by the will or of a trust to which the
will makes a devise or bequest; and individual making a claim under,
or having standing to caveat to the probate of, an earlier will. An agent,
conservator, guardian, guardian ad litem, or other fiduciary or
appropriate representative of such an interested person may act on
such interested person’s behalf.90

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-13.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5(b)(3) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5(a) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5(b) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5(b)(3) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2(b) (2021).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-17(a).
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3. Notice
Before a will can be admitted to probate in solemn form, 91 certain
persons must have received notice that a petition to probate the will has
been filed.92 These persons are then given a time period within which
they must file any objections they have to the probate of the will. 93 The
2021 Amendments lengthened that time period from ten days to thirty
days.94
4. Conclusiveness of Probate
In 2018, the Georgia Court of Appeals in the case of In re Estate of
Jones,95 injected substantial confusion into the question of when the
admission of a will to probate in solemn form becomes conclusive when it
held that an individual who had not received notice of the petition to
probate was not precluded from bringing an action to vacate the
probate.96
The 2021 Amendments amended O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2097 to bring clarity
and certainty to this issue.98 The amended provision addresses the
conclusiveness of solemn form probate as it pertains to three categories
of persons: (1) those who actually received adequate notice of the probate
proceeding99 as well as the will beneficiaries; (2) those who were required
to receive notice but were not adequately notified; and (3) all other
persons.100 Probate in solemn form is effective immediately for those
persons in the first category.101 For those in the second category, probate
in solemn form is not conclusive for four years. 102 For persons in the third
91. Probate in solemn form is discussed in detail in Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN WILLS
& ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 6:13 (2020–21 ed.).
92. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-22(a) (2021) requires that notice be given to the testator’s heirs and
to the beneficiaries and propounders of any other purported will of the testator for which
probate proceedings are pending in Georgia.
93. Id.
94. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-23 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-5-22(a)).
95. 346 Ga. App. 877, 815 S.E.2d 599 (2018). This case is described in detail in Mary
F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration, 71 MERCER L.
REV. 327, 327–30 (2019).
96. Jones, 346 Ga. App. at 878, 881, 815 S.E.2d at 600, 601.
97. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20 (2021).
98. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-21.
99. This category includes those who waive notice or receive notice through a guardian
ad litem or other person. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20(a) (2021).
100. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20 (2021).
101. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20(a) (2021).
102. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-5-16, 53-5-19; O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20(b) provides that, for these persons,
“a proceeding to probate in solemn form shall otherwise be as conclusive as if probate had
been in common form.” Id. Probate in common form does not require notice to anyone but
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category, probate in solemn form is conclusive six months from the date
on which the will is admitted to probate.103 This amendment would thus
set a clear time limit beyond which persons are not allowed to file a
petition to vacate or set aside the admission of a will to probate in solemn
form.
The Jones case also raised a question as to the grounds upon which a
probate court could set aside or vacate its order admitting a will to
probate.104 Prior to the 2021 Amendments, O.C.G.A. § 53-5-50 gave the
probate court original jurisdiction to “vacate, set aside, or amend its order
admitting a will to probate” if another will or a codicil to the admitted
will is entitled to be admitted to probate.105 The 2021 Amendments added
to O.C.G.A. § 53-5-50 those provisions from the Civil Practice Act 106 that
allow a court to set aside a judgment on the grounds of lack of personal
or subject matter jurisdiction; fraud, accident, mistake or actions by the
adverse party that are not mixed with negligence or fault of the party
moving to set aside; and a non-amendable defect on the face of the
pleadings.107
5. In terrorem Clauses
In order to discourage will beneficiaries from challenging the
provisions of the will, testators sometimes include an “in terrorem” or “nocontest” clause108 that provides that, in the event any beneficiary attacks
the validity of the will, that beneficiary’s testamentary gift is to be
forfeited.109 Georgia case law indicates, however, that if the beneficiary’s
resort to the courts is for the purpose of ascertaining doubtful rights
under the will or of learning how far other interests might be affected by
it, and not for the purpose of destroying the will or any of its provisions,
the in terrorem clause does not cause the forfeiture of that beneficiary’s

is not conclusive for four years. Id. For a discussion of probate in common form, see Mary
F. Radford, REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 6:12 (2020–21 ed.).
103. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20(c) (2021).
104. 346 Ga. App. at 878, 815 S.E.2d at 599–600.
105. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-26.
106. The provisions appear at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d).
107. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-26. New O.C.G.A. § 53-5-52 sets varying time limits for the
filing of petitions to set aside, vacate, or amend an order admitting a will to probate. Ga.
H.R. Bill 865 § 1-28.
108. See discussion of cases involving in terrorem clauses supra Section I(A).
109. These clauses are discussed in detail in Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN: WILLS &
ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 8:7 (2020–21 ed.) and in Mary F. Radford, GEORGIA TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 2:1 (2020–21 ed.).
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interest.110 The 2021 Amendments codified this concept by providing that
such a clause will not be enforceable against a person who is bringing a
cause of action for “interpretation or enforcement of a will; . . . an
accounting, for removal, or for other relief against a personal
representative;” or who is “[e]ntering into a settlement agreement.” 111
D. Amendments Relating to Year’s Support Statutes
Under Georgia law, the surviving spouse and minor children of a
decedent are entitled to an allowance out of the estate of the decedent,
which is referred to as a “year’s support.” 112 The 2021 Amendments
clarified that an award of year’s support takes precedence over all other
debts of and demands on the decedent’s estate “notwithstanding any
other provision of law to the contrary[.]” 113 The 2021 Amendments also
made it clear that a decedent’s children by any individual other than the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to a separate portion of the year’s
support award that will vest in those children. 114 If an award of year’s
support is granted but then appealed, during the pendency of the appeal,
the petitioners are entitled to be furnished with “necessaries” as allowed
by the probate court.115 In the event there is no personal representative 116
of the estate to furnish these necessaries, the 2021 Amendments allow
for the appointment of a temporary administrator117 to perform this
act.118

110. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Sinclair, 284 Ga. 500, 502, 670 S.E.2d 59, 61 (2008) (“[I]t would
violate public policy to construe the condition in terrorem so as to require the forfeiture of
a beneficiary’s interest if the beneficiary brings an action for accounting or the removal of
the executor.”)
111. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-15 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68). The 2021 Amendments
added the same provision to the statute relating to in terrorem clauses that appear in trusts.
Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-74 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22).
112. See O.C.G.A. §§ 53-3-1, 53-3-21. For an in-depth discussion of year’s support, see
Mary F. Radford, REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA, Ch. 10 (2020–21 ed.)
113. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-4 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-3-1).
114. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-9 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-3-8). Prior to the amendment this
separate award was available only to minor children of a different “spouse” of the decedent.
Id.
115. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(b) (2021).
116. A “personal representative” is defined in O.C.G.A. § 53-1-2(12) as “any
administrator, administrator with the will annexed, county administrator, or executor.”
117. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-32. A “temporary administrator” is appointed by the probate
court to perform certain limited duties for an unrepresented estate. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-6-30–
31.
118. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-12 (adding new O.C.G.A. § 53-3-21).
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E. Amendments Relating to Judicial and Nonjudicial Settlements
The parties to a dispute relating to a will or trust may choose to enter
into a settlement agreement. This settlement agreement may be private
(nonjudicial settlement) or one that is approved by a court (judicial
settlement).119 The 2021 Amendments added provisions to the Georgia
Probate Code that describe the circumstances under which a nonjudicial
settlement agreement is binding on interested parties. 120 New O.C.G.A.
§ 53-5-27 provides that the agreement must “not violate a material
intention of the testator[.]”121 The agreement must be one that could be
approved as a judicial settlement under O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25122 and will
have the same binding effect as if so approved.123
The 2021 Amendments refined O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9, which covers
nonjudicial settlement agreements relating to trust matters. 124 The
revised Code section specifically names trustees and trust directors as
those who, along with “other persons whose interests [may] [] be
affected[,]”125 to enter into nonjudicial settlement agreements on trust
matters that are binding.126 Similarly to settlement agreements relating
to wills, the agreement must “not violate a material purpose of the
trust.”127 If the settlement agreement deals with the modification or
termination of an irrevocable trust, the revised code section clarifies that
the agreement will not be valid if the settlor’s consent would be required
under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(b).128 O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61 sets out the
circumstances under which an irrevocable trust may be modified or
terminated during the lifetime of the settlor129 of the trust.130
119. As described above, the term “court” includes a superior court and any probate
court, regardless of whether the probate court has expanded jurisdiction. See supra Part
II(B).
120. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-25(c) (adding new O.C.G.A. § 53-5-27). A similar provision
covering nonjudicial settlement agreements of trust matters already existed in the Georgia
Trust Code at O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9.
121. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-27(b) (2021).
122. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25).
123. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-27(c).
124. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-73 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9).
125. Id. Prior to the amendment, the code section did not include “trust director.”
126. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9(a) (2021). The revised Code section allows trustees, trust
directors, and the other interested persons to petition a court for an expanded list of orders
including approval of the agreement itself and determinations as to whether the
requirements of the Code section were met. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9(c).
127. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § (b)(1).
128. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-9(b)(2).
129. The “settlor” of a trust is the person who created the trust. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(11)
(2021).
130. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(a)–(b) (2021).
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For judicial settlements of matters relating to wills, the 2021
Amendments added notice provisions to O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25131 as well as
the requirement that all “interested persons” give consent.132 The 2021
Amendments also repealed the requirement that a hearing be held prior
to the granting of court approval, leaving the holding of the hearing, as
well as the extent to which additional notice is needed, to the discretion
of the court.133
F. Amendments Relating to Trusts
1. Representation
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8 of the Georgia Trust Code, as amended in 2018, 134
describes those persons who can receive notice, give consents, and
otherwise bind persons who are unborn, not sui juris, or unknown on
trust matters.135 For example, if there is no conflict of interest between
the representative and the person represented, an ancestor can represent
a descendant who is not yet born or who is still a minor if there has been
no guardian or conservator appointed for that person. 136 Also, a trustee
can represent and bind the trust beneficiaries. 137 The 2021 Amendments
expanded and refined this code section. 138 The 2021 Amendments added
to the list of those who can represent others in trust matters: (1) trust
directors, who are authorized to “represent and bind the beneficiaries of
the trust on a question or dispute relating to the trust director’s powers
of direction”; and (2) persons who are specifically named in the trust
instrument to represent a beneficiary.139
The 2021 Amendments added new subsection (j) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8.
This subsection allows the representative of one person also to represent
any person who could be represented by the person who is being

131. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-24 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(b)) (requiring that the
personal representative or temporary administrator receive notice prior to the court
approval).
132. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-24 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(b)). “Interested persons” are
defined as “all persons whose interests would be affected by the approval of” the settlement
agreement. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-24 (adding O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(a)(2)).
133. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-24 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(d)).
134. This amendment is described in Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,
and Fiduciary Administration, 70 MERCER L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2018).
135. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8 (2021).
136. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(8).
137. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(4).
138. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-72 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8).
139. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-72 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(5)–(6)).

2021

WILLS & TRUSTS

297

represented if that person were alive and sui juris.140 So, for example, a
guardian who is representing a ward (as allowed by O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-8(f)(2))141 may also represent the descendants of that ward who
are not sui juris because if the ward were, in fact, sui juris, she, as an
ancestor, is authorized by O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(8)142 to represent her
descendants. Again, there must be no conflict of interest between the
representative and all the persons who are being directly or indirectly
represented.143
2. Modification of Trusts
Subsections (b) and (c) of O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61 require a court, under
certain circumstances, to approve the modification or termination of an
irrevocable trust upon the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries and
the settlor, if the settlor is still alive. 144 Prior to the 2021 Amendments,
the consent of all of the beneficiaries was required. 145 The 2021
Amendments narrowed the class of those whose consent is required to
the “qualified” beneficiaries.146 The 2021 Amendments clarified
petitioning for or consenting to a modification or termination would not
be a violation of a condition in terrorem that appeared in the trust.147 The
2021 Amendments also explained in detail the role of a trustee when a
petition for modification or termination is filed. 148 The trustee is required
to receive notice of the petition unless the trustee waives notice. 149 The
trustee has standing to intervene as a matter of right when the petition
is filed but only for the purpose of showing that one of the statutory
prerequisites for granting the modification or termination has not been
140. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-72 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8). There must be no conflict
of interest between the representative and the other persons who are being represented.
Id.
141. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(2).
142. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f)(8).
143. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8(f).
144. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(b)–(c) (2021).
145. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-76(b).
146. Id. (amended by O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(b)–(c)). O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(10) defines a
“qualified beneficiary” as
[A] living individual or other existing person who, on the date of determination
of beneficiary status: (A) Is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust
income or principal; (B) Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust
income or principal if the interests of the distributees described in subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph terminated on that date without causing the trust to
terminate; or (C) Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust
income or principal if the trust terminated on that date.
147. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-76 (adding new subsection (l) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
148. Id.
149. Id. (adding new subsection (m)(1)(A) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
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fulfilled.150 The 2021 Amendments added comprehensive provisions
about the notice required when a petition for modification or termination
is filed151 and clarified that the court may, but is not required to, hold a
hearing on a petition for modification or termination if no one objects to
or intervenes in the proceeding.152
3. Charitable Trusts
Prior to the 2021 Amendments, Georgia case law recognized that some
trusts might be “mixed trusts” because they had both charitable and
noncharitable beneficiaries.153 This concept was also recognized in
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-170(c), which spoke of a settlor establishing a trust “for
both charitable and noncharitable purposes[.]” 154 The 2021 Amendments
established that a “charitable trust,” for purposes of Georgia law, is one
in which the trust property is to be used “exclusively for charitable
purposes.”155 The 2021 Amendments deleted the term “noncharitable
trust,”156 where it appeared in the Georgia Trust Code and then clarified
which provisions of the Georgia Trust Code are not applicable to
charitable trusts.157 These provisions include those allowing the
modification of trusts upon the unanimous consent of the trust
beneficiaries and the settlor (if the settlor is still alive) 158 and those
relating to the distribution of the assets of one trust into another trust. 159
4. Definition of “Creditors”
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-80 through § 53-12-82 address the ability of a settlor
to restrict access to the trust assets by creditors of a beneficiary or the

150. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-76 (adding new subsection (m)(1)(A)(ii) to O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-61). The statutory prerequisites for granting the petition for modification or
termination if the settlor is still alive are that the settlor and all the qualified beneficiaries
have consented, and the trustee has received notice. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(b) (2021). If the
settlor is dead, in addition to the consent and notice requirements, the court must also
determine that the proposed modification does not violate a material provision of the trust
or that it is not necessary that the trust be continued in order to achieve a material purpose
of the trust. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(c) (2021).
151. Id. (adding new subsection (m)(1)(B) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
152. Id. (adding new subsection (n) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
153. See, e.g., Glass v. Faircloth, 354 Ga. App. 326, 330, 840 S.E.2d 724, 728 (2020).
154. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-80 (repealing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-170(c)).
155. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-80 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-170(a)).
156. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-76 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
157. Id. (adding new subsection (k) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
158. Id. (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61).
159. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-77 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-62).
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settlor.160 In 2014, in Morris v. Morris,161 the Georgia Court of Appeals
stated the term “creditor,” when used in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82, applied
only to one who holds a claim in contract and not to one who holds a claim
based on a tort judgment.162 The 2021 Amendments clarified that the
term “creditors,” as used in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82, includes those creditors
who are listed in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-80(d).163 O.C.G.A. § 53-12-80(d), which
describes a narrow class of claims whose holders may have limited access
to the beneficiary’s interest in the trust, includes “tort judgments.” 164
5. Trustee Compensation
Prior to the 2021 Amendments, O.C.G.A. § 53-12-210 allowed all the
qualified beneficiaries of a trust, by unanimous agreement, to set or
modify the trustee’s compensation schedule without receiving the
approval of a court.165 The 2021 Amendments added to this code section
the requirement that the trustee also be part of this agreement.166
6. Investment and Management of Trust Assets
The 2021 Amendments clarified, in investing and managing the assets
of a trust, the trustee must comply with the prudent investor provisions
that appear in Article XVI of Chapter 12 of Title 53.167 The 2021
Amendments also refined this prudent investor rule, which appears in
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340.168 The provisions of this statute were revised to
more closely follow those in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA)
that was promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1994. 169 For
example, as modified by the 2021 Amendments, the general rule of
subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340 now provides “[a] trustee shall
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would by
considering the purposes, provisions, distribution requirements, and

160. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-80–82 (2021).
161. 326 Ga. App. 378, 756 S.E.2d 616 (2014). This case is described in detail in Mary
F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, & Fiduciary Administration, 66 MERCER L. REV.
231, 242–43 (2014).
162. Id. at 384, 756 S.E.2d at 621 (referring to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82).
163. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-79 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82).
164. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-80(d)(3) (2021).
165. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-81 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-210).
166. Id.
167. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-82 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-241).
168. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-86 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340).
169. Id.; see Uniform Prudent Investor Act (Unif. L. Comm’n 1994).
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other circumstances of the trust.”170 The 2021 Amendments also added
subsection (d) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340 that allows a trustee who is
investing trust assets to take into consideration “the personal values of
the beneficiaries, including but not limited to a desire to engage in
investing strategies that align with social, political, religious,
philosophical, environmental, governance, or other values or beliefs of
the beneficiaries.”171
7. Amendments Relating to Trust Directors
The Georgia Trust Code was amended in 2018 to add a new Article 18
that deals with trust directors.172 A trust director is defined as:
[A] person that is granted a power of direction by a trust to the extent
the power is exercisable in a capacity other than as a trustee,
regardless of whether the trust instrument refers to such person as a
trust director and regardless of whether the person is a beneficiary or
settlor of the trust.173

The 2021 Amendments refined, clarified, and reorganized many of the
provisions in this Article.174 The highlights of this revision are described
in this paragraph. New subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 53-12-506 describes
who may serve as a trust director, providing basically that an individual
may serve regardless of citizenship or residency while an entity may
serve only if it “ha[s] the power to act as a trustee in Georgia.”175 O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-503 covers the duties and liabilities of a trust director. 176 New
subsection (b) of this Code section clarifies the different liability of a trust
director who holds the power of direction individually as opposed to one
who holds the power of direction jointly with the trustee or another trust
director.177 New subsection (c) of this Code section clarifies “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in the trust instrument, a trust director shall not

170. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340(a). Section 2(a) of the UPIA articulates the standard of
investing as “a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.”
171. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-86 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-340(d)).
172. Ga. H.R. Bill 121, Reg. Sess. at § 25 (2018) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-500–506).
Trust directors are discussed in depth in Mary F. Radford, GEORGIA TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 11:5 (2020–21 ed.).
173. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-500(4) (2021).
174. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 §§ 1-88–92 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-500–506).
175. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-92 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-506). The words of this new
subsection mirror those in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-200, which describes who may serve as a
trustee in Georgia.
176. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-503 (2021).
177. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-90 (adding new subsection (b) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-503).
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have the duties imposed by Code section 53-12-242 [the duty to inform
beneficiaries of the existence of the trust] and subsection (b) of Code
section 53-12-243 [the duty to account annually to the beneficiaries]”178
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-504 deals with the duties and liabilities of a directed
trustee.179 The 2021 Amendments amended subsection (a) of this Code
section to emphasize that a directed trustee must not obey a trust
director’s direction if doing so “would clearly constitute an act committed
in bad faith.”180

178. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-242 (2021); O.C.G.A. 53-12-243 (2021); Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-90
(adding new subsection (c) to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-503).
179. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-504 (2021).
180. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 § 1-91 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-504).

